FinTech

Samer Choucair: Economic Warfare Has Shifted From Punishing the Exporter to Punishing the Intermediary

Wednesday 9 September 2026 03:00
Samer Choucair: Economic Warfare Has Shifted From Punishing the Exporter to Punishing the Intermediary

Investment leader Samer Choucair said the U.S. Treasury Department’s sanctions against Türkiye-based Golden Global Yatırım Bankası and two affiliated companies reflect a broader shift in how compliance risk and cross-border capital flows are being priced in 2026.

According to Choucair, the significance of the action lies less in the size of the bank itself and more in the message it sends across the dollar-clearing system, correspondent banking, trade finance, gold markets, and energy flows.

On September 4, the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control designated Golden Global Yatırım Bankası, Golden Global Portföy Yönetimi, and Golden Global Varlık Kiralama under Executive Order 13902. OFAC said the entities were connected to financial activity involving Iran and simultaneously issued General License CC to permit the wind-down of certain transactions involving the newly blocked entities. 

The bank has rejected the U.S. allegations, according to subsequent reporting, making the distinction between the Treasury’s allegations and the institution’s position important. 

For Samer Choucair, the action should not be interpreted as a systemic crisis for Türkiye’s banking industry. Instead, it illustrates how authorities can target a specific node within a financial network spanning multiple jurisdictions.

An institutional investor does not necessarily reprice the entire Turkish market because of sanctions against one relatively small institution. What changes instead is the compliance premium attached to letters of credit, commodity financing, custody accounts, correspondent relationships, and counterparties operating across sensitive trade corridors.

Compliance Is Repricing the Cost of the Dollar

Choucair said markets have historically treated sanctions on Iran primarily as a geopolitical issue. Increasingly, however, sanctions are becoming a direct variable in the cost and availability of dollar-based financial infrastructure.

The designation of a single institution can potentially disrupt correspondent relationships, complicate guarantees, and force insurers, shipping companies, banks, and trade-finance providers to reassess their exposure.

“The economic war is moving from punishing the exporter to scrutinizing and potentially punishing the intermediary,” Choucair said. “That changes the investment equation because the risk is no longer confined to the sanctioned economy. It travels through the institutions that finance, settle, insure, transport, and custody the transaction.”

For Samer Choucair, this changes one of the fundamental questions behind institutional capital allocation.

The investor’s task is no longer simply to determine where the highest nominal return can be found. It is increasingly necessary to determine where capital can circulate without a counterparty unexpectedly becoming a compliance liability or appearing on a sanctions list.

A high-yielding transaction can rapidly become economically unattractive if the associated capital cannot move efficiently through the international financial system.

Energy and Gold Face a New Repricing Dynamic

Choucair said the implications extend into energy and gold markets.

As financial channels associated with Iranian oil trade face tighter scrutiny, gold can gain strategic importance as a physical asset that may operate outside some conventional banking settlement channels.

At the same time, greater enforcement against opaque financial and trading networks can raise insurance and maritime-transport costs and redistribute the risk premium attached to regional energy flows.

Choucair cautioned, however, that a major escalation involving the Strait of Hormuz could still reprice oil, shipping, and marine insurance substantially faster than banking sanctions alone.

For investors, this creates overlapping layers of risk.

One layer concerns the physical availability of energy. Another concerns the infrastructure required to transport it. A third concerns whether the financial institutions and counterparties processing payments remain fully connected to the international dollar system.

The investment value of an energy transaction therefore increasingly depends not only on the underlying commodity, but also on the integrity and durability of the financial chain surrounding it.

The Gulf and the Value of a Clean Financial Jurisdiction

Samer Choucair said the latest developments increase the strategic value of financial centers capable of demonstrating transparency around dollar flows, ownership structures, and the ultimate beneficial owners behind transactions.

For Saudi Arabia, this has implications extending well beyond banking.

Under Vision 2030 and the Kingdom’s broader investment strategy, Saudi Arabia is seeking to attract long-term capital into manufacturing, logistics, energy, tourism, the digital economy, and artificial intelligence. Regulatory clarity and reliable access to international dollar liquidity therefore become competitive advantages in their own right.

Global investors assessing two jurisdictions with comparable economic opportunities may increasingly assign a premium to the one offering greater regulatory predictability, stronger compliance architecture, clearer ownership structures, and more resilient international banking relationships.

Choucair said Gulf sovereign wealth funds and asset managers are unlikely to restructure entire energy portfolios because one small Turkish bank has been sanctioned.

They may, however, scrutinize their networks of correspondent banks, intermediaries, custodians, and counterparties more closely.

That distinction is critical. The underlying asset may remain attractive while the financial route used to access, finance, or settle that asset becomes materially more expensive.

Winners, Losers and the Growing Compliance Economy

Choucair said institutions relying on opaque ownership structures, poorly documented correspondent accounts, or gold transfers without clear commercial justification are likely to face greater pressure as sanctions enforcement becomes increasingly focused on intermediaries.

The potential beneficiaries are institutions capable of demonstrating transparent ownership chains and ultimate beneficial ownership, alongside compliance technology providers, fintech platforms, and specialist businesses serving areas such as maritime risk and transaction monitoring.

For financial institutions, compliance itself is becoming a larger operating expense.

Gulf banks may need to allocate additional resources to sanctions screening, transaction monitoring, counterparty due diligence, beneficial-ownership verification, and the maintenance of U.S. correspondent relationships.

That could create a relative advantage for larger financial groups capable of absorbing the fixed cost of sophisticated compliance infrastructure and maintaining extensive relationships with international banks.

Technology could consequently become an increasingly important part of the investment thesis.

Artificial intelligence, real-time transaction monitoring, digital identity, network analysis, and automated sanctions screening could evolve from back-office functions into critical financial infrastructure as regulators focus increasingly on the intermediaries that enable cross-border transactions.

The Investment Outlook

Samer Choucair said the base case is that sanctions enforcement will continue to target medium-sized institutions operating in intermediary jurisdictions where authorities identify links to restricted financial networks.

A more aggressive scenario could involve larger institutions being designated and tighter restrictions being applied to gold trading, foreign-exchange channels, and other mechanisms used to move value outside conventional banking networks.

Political de-escalation, meanwhile, could reduce the risk premium embedded in energy and shipping markets. But it would not necessarily dismantle alternative financing networks quickly or reverse the investment already being made in sanctions compliance.

For Choucair, that means institutional portfolios should increasingly distinguish among the underlying economic asset, the jurisdiction in which it operates, and the financial infrastructure through which the investment is funded and settled.

“The more resilient strategy is to build a portfolio that distinguishes between legally secure Gulf energy assets, compliance exposure in well-regulated financial centers, and sovereign gold as a hedging asset, while maintaining sufficient liquidity to reallocate capital when conditions change,” Samer Choucair said.

He concluded that the most important lesson for investors is that headline yield is becoming an increasingly incomplete measure of opportunity.

“Smart capital allocation does not begin with the question of return,” Samer Choucair said. “It begins with the question of convertibility. An asset that cannot move through the dollar system is not cheap; for an institutional investor, it may simply be uninvestable.”